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CAN WAGE BOARDS REVIVE U.S. LABOR?: MARSHALING 
EVIDENCE FROM PUERTO RICO 
CÉSAR F. ROSADO MARZÁN1
ABSTRACT
Some U.S. law reformers, labor advocates, policymakers, scholars, 
and politicians have begun to favor laws that promote sectoral bargaining. 
The aim is to revive collective bargaining and labor unions, which barely 
represent 6% of the private sector workforce. Sectoral bargaining is a col-
lective bargaining system where employers and unions bargain terms and 
conditions of employment at the industrial or sector level. It contrasts with 
employer- or plant-based bargaining promoted by U.S. federal law, specif-
ically the 1935 National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). Evidence shows that 
workers are more widely represented in collective bargaining and econom-
ic inequality is less widespread in countries with sector-based systems of 
collective bargaining. However, the evidence also shows that sectoral bar-
gaining does not necessarily increase union membership. The opposite 
might prevail, as it may encourage free riding.
Some U.S. advocates of sectoral bargaining highlight the case of New 
York State, where the government convened sector-based minimum wage 
boards authorized under its minimum wage legislation to increase wages in 
the fast-food sector to $15 an hour. The New York government convened 
the wage boards because the Fight for $15, a union-supported group advo-
cating for “$15 and a union,” had applied pressure. After the government 
increased wages in the sector, a new group called “Fast Food Justice” 
formed to represent workers in the sector. However, the group is not a 
“union,” and neither it, nor the Fight for $15, bargained with employers 
about wages. Whether wage boards can revive labor thus remains an open 
question.
 1.  Professor of Law and Co-director, Institute for Law of the Workplace, IIT Chicago-Kent 
College of Law. The author thanks Kate Andrias, Bernadette Atuahene, Ana Ermida, Matthew Finkin, 
Tristan Kirvin, and Sergio Gamonal for comments and editorial suggestions. He also thanks participants 
of University of Iowa College of Law, faculty workshop, the 2019 Colloquium on Scholarship of 
Employment and Labor Law, and the 2019 Chicago-Kent Law Review symposium participants. All 
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This article marshals historical evidence from Puerto Rico, where 
wage boards helped U.S.-based labor unions to organize the garment in-
dustry in the 1950s, ‘60s, and ‘70s. It shows that the International Ladies’ 
Garment Workers’ Union (ILGWU), an iconic New York-based union, 
leveraged significant power over small and poor Puerto Rico to get a seat 
on the wage committees of its Minimum Wage Board, which had authority 
to set binding minimum wages. The union also had amicable bargaining 
relationships with U.S.-based employers in Puerto Rico, giving the union 
the opportunity to receive neutrality and card check recognition from them 
in return. In essence, the union sought to extend U.S. non-economic terms 
to Puerto Rico while negotiating the bulk of the economic terms at the 
Board level. Through these efforts, the union succeeded in organizing 39% 
of all garment workers on the island, at a time when Puerto Rican union 
organizers perceived the sector to be unorganizable.
In New York, no tripartite structure sets wages, and employers oppose 
unions. And while unions have significant political power in New York, it 
appears to be much less than that wielded by the ILGWU over the 1950s 
poverty-stricken, colonial Puerto Rico. Therefore, to the extent Puerto Rico 
can chart a course for contemporary United States, it highlights the im-
portance of political power, tripartite negotiation and wage setting with 
erga omnes effects, and social norms in the form of amicable, collaborative 
relationships between employers and unions. Those three conditions are 
lacking in today’s New York fast-food industry and industrial relations. To 
the extent Puerto Rico charts a course, the future of sectoral bargaining in 






      06/12/2020   13:18:38
42394-ckt_95-1 Sheet No. 69 Side A      06/12/2020   13:18:38
6 ROSADO MACRO 1 EIC 5.4 (DO NOT DELETE) 5/8/2020 10:41 PM 
2020] WAGE BOARDS AND U.S. LABOR 129 
I. INTRODUCTION: TOWARDS A NEW LABOR LAW?
With U.S. union membership slumping to levels close to a near-
irrelevant 6% in the private sector,2 and after decades of Congressional 
inaction on the question of federal labor law reform, some labor activists, 
policymakers, and labor law scholars are exploring alternative pathways to 
collective bargaining and union renewal.3 One of the main ideas catching 
on is that of state-sponsored sectoral bargaining, sometimes called in the 
North American literature “broader based bargaining” or “social bargain-
ing.”4 The Service Employees International Union (SEIU), a 2-million 
member labor organization, conditioned its endorsement of any 2020 Pres-
idential candidate on the candidate’s support of the union’s bold plan for 
union renewal, called “Unions for All,” which includes sectoral bargain-
ing.5 Social-democratic presidential hopeful Bernie Sanders included sec-
toral bargaining in his platform.6 Harvard Law School’s Clean Slate 
Program has made it a centerpiece of its ambitious plan for labor law re-
form.7 Sectoral bargaining is, therefore, becoming a darling of some labor 
and left-of-center activists, reformers, scholars, and politicians. 
The purported social benefits of sectoral bargaining are significant. It 
compresses wages,8 curbing economic inequality—which is currently out 
 2.  Bureau Lab. Stats., Union Members Summary, U.S. DEP’T LAB. (Jan. 18, 2019), 
https://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm [https://perma.cc/7MLD-9PQK].
 3.  See Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1527, 
1527-12 (2002). 
 4.  Kate Andrias, The New Labor Law, 126 YALE L.J. 2, 2–100 (2016) (on sectoral and social 
bargaining); Sara Slinn, Broader-based and Sectoral Bargaining in Collective Bargaining Law Reform: 
A Historical View, 85 LABOUR/LE TRAVAIL 1, 1-29 (forthcoming 2020) (on broader based bargaining); 
see also David Madland, How to Promote Sectoral Bargaining in the United States, CTR. FOR AMER.
PROGRESS (July 20, 2019), 
https://www.americanprogressaction.org/issues/economy/reports/2019/07/10/174385/promote-sectoral-
bargaining-united-states [https://perma.cc/68LV-MZYF]; Kate Andrias & Brishen Rogers, Rebuilding 
Worker Voice in Today’s Economy, ROOSEVELT INST. (Aug. 2018), https://rooseveltinstitute.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/07/Rebuilding-Worker-Voices-final-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/2D5P-ZZWP].  
 5.  Nicole Berner & Dora Chen, SEIU Conditions 2020 Presidential Endorsement on Demand 
for “Unions for All,” ON LABOR (Aug. 21, 2019), https://onlabor.org/seiu-conditions-2020-presidential-
endorsement-on-demand-for-unions-for-all/ [https://perma.cc/BZH3-4F9X].  
 6.  Bernie Sanders Campaign, The Workplace Democracy Plan, BERNIE 2020 
https://berniesanders.com/issues/the-workplace-democracy-plan/ [https://perma.cc/67S7-779K] (last 
visited Aug. 22, 2019). The former president of the Communications Workers of America, Larry Co-
hen, has also made a similar call for sectoral bargaining. Larry Cohen, The Time Has Come for Sectoral 
Bargaining, NEW LAB. F. (June 2018), https://newlaborforum.cuny.edu/2018/06/22/the-time-has-come-
for-sectoral-bargaining [https://perma.cc/S9SX-7AR5].
 7.  See Benjamin Sachs & Sharon Block, Clean Slate for Worker Power: Building a Just Econo-
my and Democracy, HARV. L. SCH. LAB. & WORKLIFE PROGRAM 37-45 (Jan. 23, 2020), 
https://lwp.law.harvard.edu/files/lwp/files/full_report_clean_slate_for_worker_power.pdf. 
 8.  Bruce Western & Jake Rosenfeld, Unions, Norms, and the Rise in U.S. Wage Inequality, 76 
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of control in many countries, especially in the United States.9 Countries 
with sectoral bargaining systems also have a narrower gender wage gap.10
Professor Kate Andrias, a pioneering legal scholar writing on sectoral 
bargaining, builds her vision for the U.S. from current experiences.11 She 
hallmarks New York State, where the Commissioner of Labor (“Commis-
sioner”)12 can convene wage boards “to inquire into and report and recom-
mend” on the level of wages in industry and by region.13 Recently, the 
governor of New York requested that his Commissioner convene wage 
boards to recommend wages for the fast-food sector in light of pressures 
from the “Fight for $15” movement, a national campaign to increase wage 
levels to $15 an hour—more than twice the federal minimum wage.14
However, the Fight for $15 movement not only intended to increase 
wages in the sector, but also wanted to organize fast-food workers into a 
labor union capable of representing workers’ interests; at the very least, 
they wanted to organize the workers in one very large and iconic franchis-
ing firm, McDonald’s.15 While the Fight for $15 was able to exert enough 
pressure to get its $15 an hour law, it is still trying to get that elusive un-
ion.16 Will New York fast-food workers get their union? 
Despite some excitement around the prospects of sectoral bargaining 
through wage boards, there is no clear answer as to whether wage boards 
can be instituted throughout the United States and, even if so, whether they 
can reinvigorate labor and serve as an alternative to the 1935 Wagner Act 
 9.  THOMAS PICKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (Arthur Goldhammer trans., 
2014) (describing the widening gaps in income inequality around the world). 
 10.  Madland, supra note 4. On the other hand, critics of sectoral bargaining might argue that it 
promotes cartels that weed out smaller firms that provide cheaper and more efficient goods and ser-
vices. See Richard Epstein, The Cartelization of Commerce, 22 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 209 (1998). 
Others might also argue that sectoral bargaining is a straight path to servitude, as it coerces entrepre-
neurs and workers alike into associations that they do not want to join. See F.A. HAYEK, THE 
CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 205, 269 (Ronald Hamowy ed., Univ. of Chicago Press rev. ed. 2011). 
 11.  Andrias, supra note 4, at 64–66. 
 12.  New York law refers to the Commissioner of Labor as the “industrial commissioner.” N.Y. 
LAB. L. § 651 (McKinney 2016).  
 13.  Andrias, supra note 4, at 65 (citing N.Y. LAB. L. §§ 653–656). Professor Andrias also hall-
marks the 1940s experience in the United States with tripartism under the FLSA, when wage boards 
recommended wage levels to the Wage and Hour Director of U.S. Department of Labor in a way not 
too dissimilar from that of New York State. Kate Andrias, An American Approach to Social Democra-
cy: The Forgotten Promise of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 128 YALE L.J. 616 (2019). 
 14.  Andrias, supra note 4, at 8. 
 15.  Tom Juravich, Fight for $15: The Limits of Symbolic Power—Juravich Comments on Ashby,
42 LAB. STUD. J. 394, 395 (2017) (noting the symbolic nature of targeting McDonald’s). 
 16.  Jonathan Rosenblum, Fight for $15: Good Wins, But Where Did the Focus on Organizing 
Go?, 42 LAB. STUD. J. 387, 388–89 (2017) (underscoring that the Fight for $15 has yet to organize 
workers into a union); see also Kalena Thomhave, Fighting for $15—and a Union, AMER. PROSPECT
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model premised on plant- or employer-based bargaining. Empirical studies 
have shown that the relationship between sectoral bargaining and union 
membership is ambiguous.17 Moreover, to the extent sectoral bargaining 
favors unionization, those studies have focused on mostly European cas-
es.18 In Europe, labor market centralization is built through various kinds of 
extension policies (of collective bargaining agreements), not wage 
boards.19
A. The Case of Puerto Rico 
However, three cases of sectoral bargaining through minimum wage 
boards lie in Latin America. Chile, Uruguay, and the U.S territory of Puerto 
Rico20 have all had experiences with wage boards aiding unionization. 
None of these cases has ever been brought to bear on the policy debates for 
 17.  See Lyle Scruggs, The Ghent System and Union Membership in Europe, 1970-1996, 55 POL.
RES. Q. 275, 283 (2002) (labor market centralization and political power are both ambiguously related 
to union membership); See also OECD, Chapter 4: Collective Bargaining in a Changing World of 
Work, in OECD EMPLOYMENT OUTLOOK 2017, OECD ILIBRARY (2017), https://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/sites/empl_outlook-2017-8-en/index.html?itemId=/content/component/empl_outlook-2017-
8-en [https://perma.cc/BH4Q-4WDT].We should underscore that studies of labor market centralization 
have also focused on the effects of left political party power on union membership, as political parties 
can also centralize certain issues of bargaining and that otherwise strengthen unions in parliament, away 
from the individual shop floor. See Bruce Western, A Comparative Study of Working-Class Disorgani-
zation: Union Decline in Eighteen Advanced Capitalist Countries, 60 AM. SOC. REV. 179, 187 (1995); 
César F. Rosado Marzán, Successful Wage Moderation: Trust, Labor Market Centralization, and Wage 
Moderation in Puerto Rico’s Experience with Export-Led Development [hereinafter Rosado Marzán, 
Successful Wage Moderation], 9 ELECTRONIC J. COMP. L. 1, 6 (2005) (internal citations omitted) (dis-
cussing the Swedish case). 
 18.  See Western, supra note 17, at 190–95.  
 19.  On extension policies, see EUR. FOUND. FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF LIVING & WORKING
CONDITIONS, EXTENSION OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS IN THE EU 1 (2011), 
https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/sites/default/files/ef_publication/field_ef_document/ef1154en.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/62S4-RKB7].
 20.  For many Puerto Ricans, Puerto Rico is a Latin American country in a colonial relationship 
with the United States. See JOSÉ TRÍAS MONGE, PUERTO RICO: THE TRIALS OF THE OLDEST COLONY 
IN THE WORLD 161 (1997) (a former Supreme Court of Puerto Rico Chief Justice explains why Puerto 
Rico remains a U.S. colony). Despite the colonial relationship, Puerto Rico preserves its Hispanic 
identity and traditions. See RAMÓN GROSFOGUEL, COLONIAL SUBJECTS: PUERTO RICANS IN A GLOBAL 
PERSPECTIVE 9 (2003) (noting that Puerto Ricans “have a strong sense of identity and cultural national-
ism” but it is “not expressed through political natioanalism.” However, as a U.S. territory, U.S. laws 
apply to Puerto Rico. As the U.S. Federal Relations Act with Puerto Rico states, “[t]he statutory laws of 
the United States not locally inapplicable . . . shall have the same force and effect in Puerto Rico as in 
the United States.” 48 U.S.C. § 734 (2012). The meaning of what “locally inapplicable” has been the 
subject of intense litigation and remains an open question. See Developments in the Law: The Interna-
tional Place of Puerto Rico, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1656, 1669–70 (2017) (internal citations omitted). 
Federal labor and employment laws have, thus, been applicable unless otherwise explicitly provided for 
by the U.S. Congress. See N.L.R.B. v. Gonzalez Padín Co., 161 F.2d 353, 355 (1947) (the NLRA 
applies to Puerto Rico); see also MILES GALVIN, THE ORGANIZED LABOR MOVEMENT IN PUERTO RICO
132–33 (1979) (on FLSA’s applicability to Puerto Rico). The FLSA was not fully applicable until the 
late 1970s, enabling the island to experiment with other methods of wage setting, including with a wage 
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wage boards in the United States. This article thus starts to incorporate 
these Latin American cases into U.S. policy discussions. It presents sec-
ondary and original data on the case of Puerto Rico, where U.S.-based un-
ions used Puerto Rico’s wage board, in existence until Congress extended 
the FLSA to Puerto Rico in the late 1970s, to unionize the garment sector 
of the island during the 1950s, ‘60s, and ‘70s. It also summarizes the Chil-
ean experience in the literature review section below. I will explore the 
case of Uruguay in future work. 
In introducing the case of Puerto Rico into the discussion of wage 
boards in the United States, the article does not necessarily intend to advise 
U.S. activists and labor law reformers to try reenacting the island’s path, or 
to copy its 1950s law. The case of Puerto Rico cannot, singly, help chart 
the path for sectoral bargaining and union growth in the United States or 
anywhere else. Rather, the aim of this article is theoretical: it tries to con-
ceptually clarify what it would take, based on the Puerto Rican experience, 
for minimum wage boards to aid unionization. 
B. Summary of the Evidence 
The case of Puerto Rico, as detailed below, provides mixed evidence 
on the role wage boards can play to reinvigorate labor unions. It describes 
how the FLSA,21—the federal law providing for, among other things, min-
imum wages for all of the United States,—did not cover Puerto Rican em-
ployers until the late 1970s.22 Congress exempted Puerto Rico, formerly the 
“poor house of the Caribbean,” from FLSA coverage to protect the island 
from onerous labor costs that its enfeebled, mostly agrarian economy alleg-
edly could not afford.23 In lieu of FLSA wage rates, the island had to set 
wages through a tripartite Minimum Wage Board (“Board”) administered 
by the government of Puerto Rico.24 However, at first Puerto Rico’s gov-
ernment did not use the Board assertively because it wanted to preserve its 
low-wage policy to attract U.S. manufacturing to the island. In the 1950s, 
the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations 
(AFL-CIO), seeing that unionized garment employers were moving to low-
wage Puerto Rico, labeled the island a “haven for runaway industry” and 
directed its Washington lobbyists to secure the extension of the FLSA to 
 21.  29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219. 
 22.  GALVIN, supra note 20, at 164. 
 23.  Id. at 158. On the “poor house of the Caribbean,” see J. K. Galbraith, Review: Puerto Rico’s 
Economic Future: A Study in Planned Development by Harvey S. Perloff, 61 ECON. J. 635, 635–37 
(1951). 
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Puerto Rico.25 When the AFL-CIO could not immediately get enough sup-
port in Congress for the change, the International Ladies’ Garment Work-
ers’ Union (ILGWU), an AFL-CIO affiliate that was suffering drops in 
membership due to unionized garment shop relocations to Puerto Rico, 
started to directly unionize workers on the Caribbean island. While it wait-
ed for Congress to extend the FLSA to Puerto Rico, it also attempted to 
curb low wages there through collective bargaining.26 The ILGWU not 
only sent professional organizers to make direct contact with the workers, 
but also used the Board and the minimum wage committees to deftly set 
wages sector-wide.27 It led a two-pronged, sector- and plant-based strategy 
to organize workers, paired with assertive political muscle. Investing in 
organizing resources, bargaining for wages in the industry, and dangling 
FLSA extension as a sword of Damocles over Puerto Rico, the union was 
eventually able to unionize 39% of the island’s garment workers.28 Such 
organizing was remarkable, as only a few years earlier Puerto Rican union 
organizers had all but given up on organizing garment shops.29 They per-
ceived the garment industry as unorganizable because, among other things, 
workers were mostly women with allegedly no class identity or interest in 
joining unions.30
This article argues that Puerto Rico offers some lessons for U.S. sec-
toral bargaining through wage boards. First, sectoral bargaining could po-
tentially help union growth and renewal. The case of Puerto Rico adds to a 
significant body of literature that has shown such relationships, albeit not 
consistent, between sectoral bargaining and union membership.31  But, 
second, and perhaps most relevant to U.S. discussions on sectoral bargain-
ing through wage boards, the evidence shows that while wage boards might 
be capable of revitalizing unions, only certain types of wage boards in spe-
 25.  Id. at 151. 
 26.  Id.
 27.  Id.
 28.  César F. Rosado Marzán, Dependent Unionism (unpublished dissertation) 62 (2005). In its 
1950s heyday, U.S. unions reached density levels of about 33% for male workers. Western & Rosen-
feld, supra note 8, at 514. Therefore, 39% density in Puerto Rican garment production—arguably non-
white and mostly female—was a stellar accomplishment.  
 29.  Galvin, supra note 20, at 157–59.
 30.  See infra text accompanying note 150. 
 31.  See Western supra note 17, at 195; Matthew Dimick, Productive Unionism, 4 UC IRVINE L.
REV. 679, 683 (2014) (systems of sectoral bargaining, not being concerned with plant-level issues or job 
control show diminished level of employer opposition to unions). However, the OECD reports that 
other scholars have shown that extension policies might reduce incentives to join unions because it 
might foment free riding. See OECD, Chapter 3: The Role of Collective Bargaining Systems for Good 
Labour Market Performance 35, in OECD EMPLOYMENT OUTLOOK 2018, OECD ILIBRARY (2018) 
https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/empl_outlook-2018-7-
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cific political contexts actually do so. In Puerto Rico, the ILGWU effec-
tively unionized the industry because it could put effective political pres-
sure on the authorities to get a seat at the wage committees and make them 
function as the law intended. The Board existed through a “hard” law that 
gave unions the right, once in the wage committees, to bargain with em-
ployer and government representatives to set the wages for the industry. 
Having set the legally binding wages in the sector, unions could then pur-
sue much less contentious issues with management at the plant level, such 
as bargaining for nominal wage increases and fringe benefits. In other 
words, the Puerto Rican bargaining structure helped resolve the bulk of the 
most contentious bargaining issues—wages—leveling the path for plant-
based collective bargaining. New York’s law does not provide similar op-
portunities to the parties, and perhaps the lack of such opportunities ex-
plains why unions are still struggling to organize the sector. As this article 
more fully explains below, New York consults with civil society, including 
unions and employers, and other members of the public, but does not en-
franchise a tripartite (labor, management, and government) body to set 
wages. Lacking a real bargaining institution where the parties can resolve 
those thorny matters, contentious bargaining issues are likely to persist in 
New York, even if the Commissioner consults with a wage board. 
Finally, in Puerto Rico, the ILGWU had relationships with the U.S.-
based garment employers setting up shops in the island. As this article de-
tails, those relationships spanned decades and were amicable. These amica-
ble relationships helped the union receive neutrality and card check 
recognition32 from the garment employers, which then facilitated wholesale 
organizing. 
New York unions trying to organize fast food have anything but ami-
cable collective bargaining relationships with the relevant employers. 
McDonald’s and other fast-food establishments have historically been anti-
union. Hence, New York, lacking hard laws that enfranchise tripartite bod-
ies to bargain and set wages, a collective bargaining culture in the fast-food 
industry amenable to union organizing, and, perhaps most importantly, an 
organized labor movement with sufficient leverage over politicians to push 
through important policy goals (such as being enfranchised within a wage 
board to set sectoral wages) seems to have a significant way to go before 
 32.  Neutrality agreements, coupled with card-check recognition, is when an employer agrees to 
voluntarily recognize a union as a majority representative of the employees once the union proves it has 
such majority support: it is legally permitted by the National Labor Relations Act. See James J. 
Brudney, Neutrality Agreements and Card Check Recognition: Prospects for Changing Paradigms, 90 
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developing new incentives for unions to flourish through sectoral bargain-
ing, at least when compared with Puerto Rico. All in all, Puerto Rico’s 
success story shows that political power, hard laws, and social norms mat-
ter for a system of sectoral bargaining that effectively promotes labor union 
membership. 
***
Part I of this article is the Introduction. Part II summarizes the litera-
ture describing the links between sectoral bargaining and unionization, 
including the New York model. Part III describes the Puerto Rican case. 
Part IV analyzes both cases and, in doing so, highlights important differ-
ences. It particularly underscores how a legally enfranchised tripartite 
board set minimum wages in Puerto Rico, while in New York State the 
ultimate wage-setting authority is the Commissioner of Labor. Moreover, 
while in Puerto Rico the U.S. garment union brought with it collective bar-
gaining relationships that it could leverage on the island, New York unions 
are trying to bargain with a sector (fast food) that has been historically 
resisted unionization. U.S. unions in Puerto Rico were able to effectively 
participate in the Board by flexing their political muscle, which they might 
not have in present-day New York. These normative differences, legal and 
social, and the political context, seem to explain why the ILGWU was able 
to organize more than a third of the once seen as un-organizable, Puerto 
Rican garment workers,  while the Fight for $15 movement has not realized 
its goal of creating a union. Part V concludes with further issues left open 
by this article and possibilities for further research. 
II. SECTORAL BARGAINING, WAGE BOARDS, AND UNION RENEWAL
Social scientists have shown that sectoral bargaining can spur union 
growth because, in such “centralized” bargaining systems, unions are con-
cerned about equalizing conditions across heterogeneous groups of work-
ers.33 They are less concerned about bargaining plant-level issues, e.g., “job 
control,” for particular groups of workers. Therefore, in systems of sectoral 
bargaining, unions do not get into adversarial relationships with plant man-
agers, or at least not to the extent unions and employers typically do in 
systems of employer-level or plant bargaining.34 Moreover, once wages are 
set in the industry and all the employers must pay the same wages, employ-
ers are less concerned about how the price of labor may undermine their 
 33.  Dimick, supra note 31, at 684–85. 
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competitive advantage vis-à-vis other firms, thus lowering their opposition 
to unions. Given less employer opposition to unions, labor unions should 
be able to recruit workers with more ease when they operate in sectoral or 
centralized bargaining environments.35
Sectoral bargaining contrasts with the model of collective bargaining 
institutionalized by the 1935 Wagner Act,36 which takes the plant or em-
ployer as its starting point.37 In plant or employer systems of bargaining, 
employers oppose unions more than in systems of sectoral bargaining, as 
described above, because the parties are in constant disputes over shop-
level issues related to job control.38 Moreover, employers oppose unioniza-
tion because it may put them in competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis non-
union firms, especially on issues of wages.39 Additionally, the retail, i.e., 
plant-by-plant, nature of such organizing makes unions smaller and collec-
tive bargaining coverage narrower.40 Overall, decentralized systems lack 
robust incentives for collective bargaining. They also lack the institutional 
tools to compress wages across the board and curb economic inequality.41
Most of the better-known systems of sectoral bargaining are located in 
the European Union.42 Even though rare in the United States, given the 
dominant employer or plant-based Wagner model, Professor Andrias has 
argued that at least an incipient form of sectoral bargaining is developing in 
New York and elsewhere in the United States, charting a path for a “new 
labor law.” We now turn to the New York case. 
A. New York, New Hope? 
In 2016, New York State decided to increase minimum wages in the 
fast-food industry significantly above the federal minimum wage.43 The 
law established that in New York City all large fast-food establishments 
were to pay their employees at least $11 an hour by December 31, 2016, 
 35.  Paul Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers’ Rights to Self-Organization Under the 
NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769, 1769–70 (1983) (arguing that employer opposition to unions explains 
union decline). 
 36.  National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended 
at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (1947)). 
 37.  Andrias, supra note 4, at 16. 
 38.  Dimick, supra note 31, at 683–84. 
 39.  See Andrias, supra note 4, at 94. 
 40.  Id. at 35 (noting that sectoral bargaining provides for much wider coverage, indeed, so broad 
that collective bargaining agreements amount to more general employment policy). 
 41.  OECD, supra note 31, § 3.3.1 (discussing wage dispersion between countries with plant and 
sector-based systems of collective bargaining). 
 42.  Id.
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$13 an hour by December 31, 2017, and $15 an hour by December 31, 
2018.44 It also set wages at $12.75 for most of the rest of the state, and built 
in periodic increases until the state-wide minimum wage reaches $15 an 
hour by 2021.45 The minimum wage increase came only after a long strug-
gle spearheaded by the Fight for $15 movement, a campaign funded and 
led by the SEIU.46 A central aim of this campaign was to galvanize non-
union, fast-food employees, who mostly earned wages close to the legal 
minimum, and get them active with the labor movement.47 These workers 
have also been historically unrepresented by labor unions and in collective 
bargaining.48 At the time of the New York minimum wage hike, wages in 
the fast-food industry were so low that 46% of the workers were on public 
assistance programs;49 this rate is double the percentage of workers in other 
industries.50 Almost 90% did not have health care insurance.51
The Fight for $15 aimed not only to get fast-food workers a better 
wage, but also a “union.”52 McDonald’s became the focus of this cam-
paign.53 Not only is McDonald’s an iconic firm, but is also a major franchi-
sor—sometimes even seen as the original franchising company (it is not).54
The Fight for $15 also wanted to bind McDonald’s Corporation as a joint 
 44.  Id. § 652 (a)(i). Smaller fast-food establishments should also reach $15 an hour by December 
31, 2019. Id. § 652 (a)(ii).
 45.  Id. § 652 (b). 
 46.  Andrias, supra note 4, at 8. 
 47.  See Michael M. Oswalt, Improvisational Unionism, 104 CAL. L. REV. 597, 605 (2016) (argu-
ing that groups like the Fight for $15 aim to galvanize to workers inprovisationally to see what kinds of 
new organizing successes they might be able to do in contemporary times). 
 48.  In New York State, 60% of all workers employed by fast-food chains were enrolled in at least 
one public assistance program, and 75% earned the legally lowest wage. FAST FOOD WAGE BD., N.Y.
DEP’T LAB., REPORT OF THE FAST FOOD WAGE BOARD TO THE NYS COMMISSIONER OF LABOR 1
(2015) [hereinafter N.Y. REPORT]. 
 49.  Id.
 50.  Id. at 1, 9. 
 51.  Id. at 1. 
 52.  Andrias, supra note 4, at 8. 
 53.  Id. at 58–62; Oswalt, supra note 47, at 602, 623 (describing the symbolic weight of large 
brand name stores such as Walmart and McDonald’s); STEVEN GREENHOUSE, BEATEN DOWN,
WORKED UP THE PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE OF AMERICAN LABOR 246 (2019). 
 54.  In 2019, McDonald’s was the largest franchisor in the United States. Franchise 500,
ENTREPRENEUR, https://www.entrepreneur.com/franchise500 [https://perma.cc/ZME9-VHNZ] (last 
visited on Dec. 18, 2019). In the U.S., franchising operations started in the 19th century pubs and rail-
road station restaurants. In the 20th Century, several restaurant chains started before McDonald’s, 
including Carvel (1934), Kentucky Fried Chicken (1930), Dairy Queen (1940); Dunkin Donuts (1950), 
and Burger King (1954). McDonald’s franchises started in 1955. Michael H. Seid, Where It All Began: 
The Evolution Of Franchising, FRANCHISE CHAT, http://www.franchise-
chat.com/resources/where_it_all_began_the_evolution_of_franchising.htm [https://perma.cc/WP67-
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employer of all McDonald’s employees, especially those working in the 
franchises.55
The Fight for $15 was to some degree incredibly successful. What 
perhaps some years earlier had appeared to be a movement with the merely 
aspirational goal of inspiring activism rather than attaining any specific 
goal, it in fact attained tangible results.56 Workers across New York would 
get $15 an hour in the industry, at least in the short- to medium-term. And 
this was not your traditional legislative process where lawmakers in the 
upper and lower houses of New York’s assembly agreed on a compromise 
bill to increase the minimum wage, then had it signed by the governor. 
Unlike perhaps all other states, New York State has a minimum wage law 
that permits the Commissioner of Labor to convene minimum wage boards 
to determine how much wages should be increased in a particular indus-
try.57 At the insistence of the Fight for $15 movement, which carried out 
strikes and protests for higher wages, Governor Cuomo asked the Commis-
sioner to issue a report on wages in the fast-food industry.58 The Commis-
sioner, required by law to assess the “life and health of the workers,” found 
that wages in the fast-food industry were inadequate to sustain either. The 
Commissioner then convened the wage boards to recommend wage levels 
that could satisfy the law’s demands for wages adequate to sustain “life and 
health.”59
The committee was composed of three representatives: Byron Brown, 
mayor of the City of Buffalo, representing the public interest, Michael 
Fishman, secretary treasurer of the SEIU in Washington, DC, representing 
labor, and Kevin Ryan, vice chair of the Partnership for New York City and 
former CEO of Gilt, the online apparel company, representing employers.60
Many groups provided testimony to the wage board, including the activists 
with the Fight for $15.61 On May 6, 2016, the governor of New York 
signed the order.62
 55.  Andrias, supra note 4, at 58. 
 56.  Oswalt, supra note 47, at 655. 
 57.  N.Y. LAB. LAW § 653 (McKinney 2000) (Commissioner shall appoint a wage committee if he 
concludes that workers in a particular occupation are not receiving wages sufficient to maintain them-
selves and their health). See also id. at § 659.1 (Commissioner of Labor can reconvene minimum wage 
committees after 6 months wages had come into effect to reevaluate minimum wages and modify them, 
if necessary). 
 58.  Andrias, supra note 4, at 64. 
 59.  Id. at 64–65. 
 60.  N.Y. REPORT, supra note 48, at 21. 
 61.  Id. at 4–6.  





      06/12/2020   13:18:38
42394-ckt_95-1 Sheet No. 74 Side A      06/12/2020   13:18:38
6 ROSADO MACRO 1 EIC 5.4 (DO NOT DELETE) 5/8/2020 10:41 PM 
2020] WAGE BOARDS AND U.S. LABOR 139 
But while many sectors of civil society participated in the process to 
determine wages in the fast-food industry, labor and management did not 
negotiate and decide a wage hike that directly concerned them both.63 Un-
like traditional tripartite arrangements where management and labor, in 
conjunction with the state, agree on and set the terms of employment, in-
cluding wages,64 the New York system is one where the Commissioner has 
the final say on wages.65 The tripartite wage boards can only provide a 
report and a recommendation.66 While some employer and labor groups,67
including the Fight for $15, made their voices heard in front of the tripartite 
board, the Commissioner, not the wage board, issued the final order.68
In an interview, a Fight for $15 leader argued that the process towards 
a $15-dollar minimum wage in fast food was “collective bargaining.” As 
Professor Andrias recounts: “In a rare media interview published on Au-
gust 30, 2015, the Fight for $15 campaign director Scott Courtney reflect-
ed: ‘I would call what happened [in New York] collective bargaining, and I 
would call that a union,’ even though there was no ‘bargaining’ with em-
ployers.”69 According to New York Times reporter Steven Greenhouse, 
Courtney described the Fight for $15’s experience with the wage boards 
was “like collective bargaining on steroids.”70 But spin should not be con-
fused with reality. There was no collective bargaining agreement of any 
sort. There was no union negotiating terms with management, nor man-
agement with the union. And at the most general levels of comparative 
 63.  Id. at 66–67. 
 64.  For example, and as explained by Professor Anne Trebilcock, “In the tripartite context of the 
[International Labor Organization], the term ‘Member States’ encompasses the representatives of 
Employers and Workers, who alongside those of government take the decisions about which items will 
be considered for possible standard-setting.” Anne Trebilcock, Putting the Record Straight About 
International Labor Standard Setting, 31 COMP. LAB. L. POL’Y J. 553, 554 (2010). 
 65.  The Wage Board only “inquires and reports.” N.Y. LAB. LAW § 653 (McKinney 2000). It can 
conduct public hearings, report, and make recommendations to the Commissioner. Id. §§ 655 (3)–(5). 
On the other hand, the Commissioner has the authority to order minimum wages and regulations. Id. § 
657. Hence, the Commissioner sets the wages. 
 66.  Id. § 655(5). 
 67.  The employer groups who provided testimony to the New York fast-food wage board were: 
the Business Council for New York State, the Competitive Enterprise Institute, Dunkin Donuts, Em-
ployment Policies Institute, Fiscal Policy Institute, International Franchise Association, Manhattan 
Institute for Policy Research, National Federation of Independent Businesses, National Restaurant 
Association, New York State Association of Convenient Stores, New York State Restaurant Associa-
tion. N.Y. REPORT, supra note 48, at 5–6.
 68.  Andrias, supra note 4, at 65. 
 69.  Id. at 66. 
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industrial relations, unions are, at a minimum, organizations that negotiate 
workers’ pay with employers.71
So, what happened in New York? The governor signed the Commis-
sioner of Labor’s order after some labor and employer groups, as well as 
other groups, had their say before a tripartite committee that could only 
make recommendations to the Commissioner. In fact, employers resisted 
attempts to raise wages and to organize workers, and still do.72 McDonald’s 
expressly stated that it would not meet with the Fight for $15 or the SEIU 
because they do “not represent any employee in a McDonald’s restau-
rant.”73 In this fashion, the New York minimum wage-setting system re-
mains in the hands of the government’s executive branch, and not of a 
tripartite wage board. The relevant parties also never resolved their differ-
ences. Labor just happened to have its champion, the governor of New 
York State, who imposed the sum of $15 an hour on the fast-food industry. 
After New York increased minimum wages, the SEIU created a new 
not-for-profit organization, Fast Food Justice.74 It is a voluntary association 
of fast-food workers who advocate for themselves and their interests.75
New York City has passed a new law, commonly referred to as the “De-
ductions Law,” that helps fund the new organization by giving fast food 
employees the right to demand that their employers send dues directly from 
their paychecks to non-union, not-for-profit groups like Fast Food Justice.76
 71.  See Michael Wallerstein & Bruce Western, Unions in Decline? What has Changed and Why,
2000 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 355, 356 (2000). For a critique of the Fast for $15, see Nelson Lichtenstein, 
Two Roads Forward for Labor: The AFL-CIO’s New Agenda, DISSENT (Winter 2014), 
http://www.dissentmagazine .org/article/two-roads-forward-for-labor-the-afl-cios-new-agenda, 
[https://perma.cc/HH6C-NW4H] 
 72.  In the case of New York, some employer representatives did participate and provided testi-
mony to the wage committees, even supporting some increases. However only the Vermont-based, 
openly liberal company, Ben & Jerry’s Ice Cream, supported a wage hike to $15 an hour. The New 
York Commissioner of Labor and the Governor thus extended minimum wages to up to $15 an hour 
without explicit employer consent. 
 73.  GREENHOUSE, supra note 53, at 248. 
 74.  FAST FOOD JUSTICE, https://www.fastfoodjustice.org [https://perma.cc/M5QS-24UC] (last 
visited on Dec. 18, 2019). See also Max Zahn, The Future of the Low-Wage Worker Movement May 
Depend on a Little-Known New York Law, IN THESE TIMES (Aug. 15, 2017), 
https://inthesetimes.com/working/entry/20429/low-wage-worker-unions-fight-for-15-New-York-
workers-rights-fast-food [https://perma.cc/3T67-4EXW]. 
 75.  FAST FOOD JUSTICE, supra note 74. 
 76.  N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE §§ 20-1301–1310 (2017). This law was part of a package of laws 
enacted by New York City on 2017, commonly referred to as the “Fair Workweek” laws. While these 
laws dealt mostly with scheduling rules, they included new rules giving employees of fast food employ-
ers the right to have part of their paychecks sent directly to non-for-profit organizations of the fast-food 
industry. Eli Z. Freedberg et al., New York City Enacts Laws Limiting Employers’ Flexibility To Staff 
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At least 500 workers must pledge to send money to the group before em-
ployers are obligated to send the funds to the group.77 Fast Food Justice 
seeks to maintain worker voice in future minimum wage studies and hear-
ings, and perhaps in other forums.78 It also seeks to advocate for workers’ 
immigration, housing, and transportation concerns.79 Currently, it is sup-
porting a campaign for just cause termination for fast-food workers.80 The 
Times’s Greenhouse reports that the group counts  2,000 dues-paying 
members.81 Its goal, however, is to get at least 10,000 of the 65,000 fast 
food workers and to build a $1.8 million treasure chest to run its cam-
paigns.82
But despite real gains, both by increasing wages for many workers and 
building a new organization, Fast Food Justice is certainly still trying to 
find a foothold within New York’s labor institutions.83 As we will see be-
low, especially when compared to Puerto Rico in the 1950s–1970s, the 
absence of employer, union, and state collective bargaining and wage-
setting authority shows the still inchoate nature of tripartism and sectoral 
bargaining in New York. True, the Commissioner must hear a tripartite 
committee that, in turn, has heard labor and employer groups, and the De-
ductions Law gives special funding rights to quasi-labor groups like Fast 
Food Justice. These legal norms may inch New York closer to sectoral 
bargaining and union renewal. But Fast Food Justice is still a fledgling 
group with no clear bargaining role or membership. The future of this or-
ganization as a labor market institution, a union, is unknowable.84
B. Other Wage Board Cases in the Literature 
Most models of sectoral bargaining known and discussed in the litera-
ture are in Europe.85 None of those models of sectoral bargaining include 
 77.  N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 20-1303(3). 
 78.  FAST FOOD JUSTICE, supra note 74. 
 79.  GREENHOUSE, supra note 53, at 249. 
 80.  Patrick McGeehan, After Winning a $15 Minimum Wage, Fast Food Workers Now Battle 
Unfair Firings, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 19, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/12/nyregion/fast-food-
worker-firings.html [https://perma.cc/PU3Q-7DW6]. 
 81.  GREENHOUSE, supra note 53, at 249. 
 82.  Id.
 83.  See Kalena Thomhave, Fighting for $15—and a Union, AMER. PROSPECT (Oct. 16, 2018), 
https://prospect.org/article/fighting-15-and-union [https://perma.cc/YQ9W-PHXZ] (detailing how 
workers still lack a bargaining agent in fast food). 
 84.  See RICHARD B. FREEMAN AND JAMES L. MEDOFF, WHAT UNIONS DO? (1984) (describing 
roles of U.S. unions as institutions). 
 85.  See Western, supra note 17, at 181 (describing an eighteen-country study focused on thirteen 
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tripartite minimum wage boards. Some wage boards have been studied, but 
those cases seem to mostly lie in Latin America and in the U.S. Common-
wealth of Puerto Rico. 
One important study, now over 40 years old, is Professor Lance Com-
pa’s study of Chile’s tripartite wage commissions, bolstered by the socialist 
government of the short-lived Unidad Popular (UP) coalition (1970–73).86
In that study, Professor Compa described how the Eduardo Frei Montalva 
government (1964-1970), of the centrist Christian Democrats, recreated 
tripartite wage commissions, bodies where unions, employers, and gov-
ernment set wages for Chilean industry, after false starts in other eras.87 But 
despite inscribing the law into the law books, the Frei government never 
convened the commissions because, according to the historical record, his 
advisors alleged that the times were “inopportune” for them.88
The UP government, however, was different. It wanted to use these 
commissions to support the government’s overall economic plan for a so-
cialist economy, where certain industries, such as textiles, could expand 
and grow while workers, exerting socialist solidarity, would moderate wage 
claims to generate a surplus that could then be redistributed throughout the 
population.89 Another goal of the commissions was to generate incentives 
for workers to join unions and increase the overall power and influence of 
workers and organized labor in the Chilean political economy, necessary 
for a successful political environment for socialism. Indeed, Professor 
Compa mentions that unions and strike militancy grew significantly in 
Chile after the wage committees became active. Union activity grew be-
cause, first, the UP government, unlike its predecessors, relaxed unioniza-
tion rules to ease their formation.90 It also stopped using police and other 
instruments of formal state repression against unions and striking work-
ers.91 Second, the executive decree issued by the President to enforce the 
wage commission’s law enfranchised the government to declare which 
unions and employers could bargain by sector.92 Inevitably, the govern-
 86.  Lance Compa, Labor Law and the Legal Way: Collective Bargaining in the Chilean Textile 
Industry Under the Unidad Popular 32 (Yale Law Sch. Program in Law and Modernization, Working 
Paper No. 23, 1973), http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/workingpapers/98/ [https://perma.cc/PAE4-
7KWZ] (internal citations omitted).  
 87.  Id. at 33.  Certain kinds of wage commissions, called tarifados, existed in Chile since the 
1930s. See KARINA NARBONA, OBSERVATORIO SOCIAL, ANTECEDENTES DEL MODELO DE RELACIONES 
LABORALES CHILENO 6-9 (2nd ed. 2015); Law No. 6020 art. 11, Febrero 5, 1937, DIARIO OFICIAL
[D.O.] (Chile). 
 88.  Compa, supra note 86, at 32.  
 89.  Id. at 40 
 90.  Id. at 38–39. 
 91.  Id. at 38–39. 
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ment favored pro-government—socialist and communist—unions, which 
tipped the scales politically against employers and other groups outside the 
ruling coalition of the UP.93 Pro-government unions, emboldened, struck 
for an array of issues, including wage hikes.94 While that militancy con-
flicted with the government’s overall plan for wage moderation, it resulted 
directly from its political goal to support organized labor.95
Later, however, with the economy in disarray, and the Cold War at its 
height, a right-wing coup by the Chilean military toppled the UP govern-
ment in 1973. It destroyed the tripartite committees, broke most unions, 
eviscerated democracy in the country, and brutally violated basic human 
rights.96 Hence, while the wage commissions might have given a temporary 
boost to unions in Chile, their life was tied to the government, which came 
to an abrupt end with the 1973 coup. 
A second case of wage commissions, much more positive, is Uru-
guay.97 Uruguay has had a system of industry-wide wage commissions, 
called Consejos Tripartitos de Salarios, or Tripartite Wage Councils, since 
about the early-to-mid 1940s, when the country enacted Law No. 10.4499 
of 1943.98 As in Chile, the Uruguayan executive convened these councils.99
Without an executive willing and capable of convening them—and these 
executives have mostly been left-of-center—the wage councils would not 
operate. In 2009, however, a new law gave the parties the right to request 
that the government convene the wage councils.100 But despite the govern-
ment’s historical role in convening the wage councils (until 2009), different 
from Chile’s UP tripartite wage committees, Uruguayan bargaining agents 
have had the reputation of acting autonomously; there has been no official 
government sanction or control of the parties, thereby providing a more 
genuine tripartite institution where all interests are independently repre-
sented.101
In Uruguay’s tripartite wage councils, parties bargain over wages sec-
torally and set them by agreement. Parties typically bargain over other 
terms and conditions of employment for each industrial sector and draw 
 93.  Id. at 37. 
 94.  Id.
 95.  Id. at 41–42. 
 96.  See Peter Winn, The Pinochet Era. In THE CHILEAN MIRACLE: WORKERS AND 
NEOLIBERALISM IN THE PINOCHET ERA, 1973–2002 14 (Peter Winn ed., 2004).  
 97.  See Sergio Gamonal Contreras & Pablo Arellano Ortiz, Negociación colectiva, autonomía y 
abstención legislativa, 124 REVISTA IUS ET PRAXIS 173, 176 (2018). 
 98.  Id. at 177. 
 99.  Id. at 179. 
 100.  Law 18.566, art. 9 (2009) (Uruguay). 
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collective bargaining agreements to such ends.102 Uruguay’s wage councils 
are said to have strengthened unions there.103 In future work I will explore 
the Uruguayan case in more detail. 
A third case where wage boards have aided unionization is the Com-
monwealth of Puerto Rico of the 1950s–70s. With the exception of my 
prior work,104 this case has been studied in little detail. Using secondary 
and original data that I collected, below I show how Puerto Rico’s Board 
helped U.S. unions organize the centrally important garment sector of the 
island. 
III. PUERTO RICO
Before it was incorporated into the U.S. overseas empire at the con-
clusion of the 1898 Spanish-American War, Puerto Rico was a Spanish 
colony. Thus, it has had a mixed labor and legal history that spans Latin 
American and U.S. Anglo-American traditions.105 Included in that hybrid 
history is an experiment with sector-based wage committees and a tripartite 
Board to set minimum wages.106 The experiment lasted about three dec-
ades, from the 1950s to the end of the 1970s, when Congress finally ex-
tended the FLSA to the island.107 As explained in my earlier work, those 
committees helped U.S. labor unions co-determine minimum wages in 
Puerto Rico’s important garment industry and to unionize almost 40% of its 
workers, after local Puerto Rican organizers had apparently abandoned the 
prospect.108 This section summarizes that history. First, it shows that politi-
cal power matters for unions to use the law effectively and get a seat at the 
table where decisions are made. In 1950s Puerto Rico, the AFL-CIO and its 
important affiliate, the ILGWU, got seats in the government’s minimum 
 102.  Id. 
 103.  Id. at 178. 
 104.  See Rosado Marzán, Successful Wage Moderation, supra note 17; Rosado Marzán, supra note 
28. 
 105.  Ennio M. Colón García et al., A Mixed Legal System, 32 REV. JURÍDICA U. INTER. P.R. 227, 
229 (1998) (explaining that Puerto Rico has a hybrid legal system that incorporates civil law and com-
mon law traditions); JORGE FARINACCI FERNÓS, LA CONSTITUCIÓN OBRERA DE PUERTO RICO (Huracán 
ed., 2015) (describing how the influential Puerto Rican Partido Socialista of the first half of the 20th
Century was instrumental in crafting a Puerto Rico constitution with an array of labor rights, as well as 
statutory laws, that protect Puerto Rico’s workers to this date, beyond what U.S. federal laws, and most 
state laws, do); Jorge Farinacci Fernós, The Search for a Wrongful Dismissal Statute: A Look at Puerto 
Rico’s Act No. 80 As a Potential Starting Point, 17 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 125, 128 (2013) (argu-
ing that Puerto Rico’s dismissal protections go beyond what most American legal commentators com-
prehend because they have failed to study the relevant jurisprudence). 
 106.  Rosado Marzán, Successful Wage Moderation, supra note 17, at 44–47. 
 107.  GALVIN, supra note 20, at 164. 
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wage committees after they threatened to pursue relentless efforts in Wash-
ington to extend the FLSA to Puerto Rico, which would have frustrated 
Puerto Rico’s policy of wage moderation for economic development. U.S. 
unions elbowed their way into Puerto Rico’s halls of power by threatening 
to exert their own political muscle in the United States. 
Second, the Puerto Rican Board and its minimum wage committees 
where the U.S.-based unions participated were true tripartite organizations 
where state, employer, and union representatives had authority to set wages 
through a process of sectoral bargaining. The parties settled at that sectoral 
level the guts of the economic terms governing workers in the vital garment 
industry of Puerto Rico, leveling the way for plant-based organizing and 
collective bargaining in the industry. 
Third, the ILGWU mobilized its informal networks, namely its preex-
isting, collaborative relationships with employers in the U.S. mainland, to 
persuade employers to agree to card check and neutrality agreements, and 
bargain for nominal wage increases and marginal benefits. In other words, 
the union persuaded employers to extend its U.S. master contracts to Puerto 
Rico once the bulk of the economic issues had been resolved at the Board. 
Hence, the ILGWU’s political power, its mobilization of binding law 
(through its participation in the wage committees), and social networks 
(pre-existing relationships with employers in the U.S.) paid off. At the end, 
it significantly unionized 39% of what had previously been considered a 
precarious, feminized sector resistant to unionization. 
A. Political Power 
The Puerto Rican experiment with sectoral bargaining and a wage 
board likely started when the U.S. Congress excluded Puerto Rico from the 
FLSA of 1938, on the presumption that U.S. wage levels would hurt the 
agrarian and poverty-stricken island.109 In lieu of the FLSA, Congress ex-
pected that Puerto Rico would use its Board to set minimum wages. It was 
originally created in 1941 to set industry-specific minimum wages and 
stabilize prices during World War II.110
The Board, however, lay mostly dormant in the immediate post-World 
War II period because official government policy mandated wage modera-
 109.  GALVIN, supra note 20, at 132–33. 
 110.  Id. at 132–33. World War II compelled the U.S. government to coordinate industrial policy 
with organized employer and worker groups, all for the war effort, generating a sort of short-lived 
corporatism. See Nelson Lichtenstein, From Corporatism to Collective Bargaining: Organized Labor 
and the Eclipse of Social Democracy in the Postwar Era, in RISE AND FALL OF THE NEW DEAL 
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tion.111 In 1947, Puerto Ricans elected their first governor, Luis Muñoz 
Marín, who came with a mandate to transform the “poor house of the Car-
ibbean” into a more prosperous place. Heralding a populist message, 
Muñoz Marín and his Popular Democratic Party (“PDP”) won supermajori-
ties in four consecutive elections.112 In 1964, the PDP won a fifth consecu-
tive election under Roberto Sánchez Vilella, Muñoz Marín’s successor.113
The PDP ran a corporatist-type state where labor leaders were coopted or 
repressed if they did not follow the lead of the PDP.114 In essence, Muñoz 
Marín copied the state corporatist styles of many of his Latin American 
counterparts.115 He disciplined labor to follow the government’s plan for 
wage moderation—which the government argued was the key to attracting 
U.S. industry to the island.116 An American chronicler of the Puerto Rican 
labor movement, Miles Galvin, thus noted that by the 1950s, “it was 
clear . . . that organized labor, with most of its leadership either neutralized 
or compromised, has been seriously weakened.”117
However, as U.S. factories, mostly in the garment industry, relocated 
to Puerto Rico in the 1950s, one thing complicated matters: the 1955 mer-
ger of the AFL and the CIO. In its inaugural conference, the AFL-CIO 
denounced Puerto Rico as a “haven for runaway industry,” and began an 
aggressive campaign to fully extend the FLSA to the island.118 The AFL-
CIO was ultimately unsuccessful in getting Congress to extend the FLSA to 
the island, but the political tug of war between U.S. unions and the Puerto 
Rican government did result in an eventual truce where important U.S. 
unions, including, most prominently, the ILGWU, began to collaborate 
with the Puerto Rican government.119 Miles Galvin mentioned that the 
Puerto Rico government gave that union, and other AFL-CIO affiliates, a 
“free hand” to organize in Puerto Rico, as long as the unions supported the 
government’s program in Washington, DC.120 Thereafter, and at the un-
ions’ insistence, the Puerto Rican legislature passed Law 96 of 1956,121
 111.  GALVIN, supra note 20, at 146–48. 
 112.  GALVIN, supra note 20, at 120 (noting the election of Roberto Sanchez Vilella, of the Popular 
Democratic Party, in 1964, and the triumph of the New Progressive Party in 1968). 
 113.  Id. 
 114.  Id. at 152–55. 
 115.   Philippe Schmitter, Still the Century of Corporatism?, 36 REV. POL. 85, 86 (1974) (defining 
state corporatism and its presence in Latin America). 
 116.  GALVIN, supra note 20, at 147–48 
 117.  Id. at 155. 
 118.  Id. at 157.  
 119.  See Rosado Marzán, supra note 28, at 77–78 (citing letter from David Dubinsky to Luis 
Muñoz Marín describing how they did not always see “eye-to-eye” but shared the same goals). 
 120.  GALVIN, supra note 20, at 159. 
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which declared that the new wage policy was to equalize wages with the 
U.S. mainland through collective bargaining.122 The ILGWU’s president, 
David Dubinsky, achieved an important position of influence in Puerto 
Rico, and his union participated in the island’s wage committees, heralding 
a new era for labor law, collective bargaining, labor politics, and even U.S-
Puerto Rico relations.123
B. Binding Law 
The Board had authority to “issue regulations and to exercise all other 
powers necessary to accomplish the purposes” of Law 96.124 It had a duty 
to study conditions in industry.125 It had robust investigative powers and 
could issue subpoenas to study said conditions.126 It could also administer 
oaths and collect testimony for its investigations.127 Before issuing a man-
datory decree, it had to summon industry committees with an equal number 
of employer, employee, and public interest (government) representatives 
who would recommend draft decrees.128 The Board had to provide the 
wage committees with the necessary experts (“lawyers, economists, stenog-
raphers, translators, clerks and other personnel”) to perform their ministeri-
al duties.129 Like Board members, wage committee members could 
“administer oaths, summon witnesses and issue subpoenas.”130
After a wage committee handed a draft decree to the Board, the Board 
had to call for public hearings to discuss the draft decree.131 The law man-
dated that the public have an opportunity to express itself at these hearings. 
After the hearings, the Board could either accept or reject the draft de-
cree.132 If accepted, the draft decree had the force of law and became a 
“mandatory decree” establishing the minimum wages in that industry. If 
rejected, the draft decree could only be tabled; the Board could reconvene 
the same or a different committee to reconsider the draft decree and pro-
vide the Board with a new one.133
 122.  Id. §§ 1(b), (e), at 624-25. 
 123.  Galvin, supra note 20, at 157–61. 
 124.  Minimum Wage Act of Puerto Rico § 2(f), at 628. 
 125.  Id. § 3(a), at 628. 
 126.  Id. § 4(a), at 628. 
 127.  Id. § 4(b), at 628. 
 128.  Id. § 10(a), at 660. 
129.  Id. § 10(d), at 662. 
 130.  Id. § 10(f), at 662. 
 131.  Id. §§ 11(a)–(b), at 662-64. 
 132.  Id. § 13(b), at 664-66. 
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The Supreme Court of Puerto Rico had the authority to review a man-
datory decree.134 However, the grounds for review were limited; the Su-
preme Court had to afford a high level of deference to the Board. It could 
annul or remand a decree, but only if parties challenging the decree proved 
that a minimum wage committee had acted “without authority or ultravires 
[sic],” or “because the Board acted without authority or ultravires [sic],” or 
“because the decree was procured through fraud.”135
Hence, the cases before the Puerto Rico Supreme Court challenging 
the validity of a mandatory decree hinged, in many situations, on the data 
used to produce a draft decree, and the reasonableness of the mandatory 
decree in light of such numbers. For example, in Sierra v. Puerto Rico Ce-
real Extracts, the Puerto Rico Supreme Court held that a mandatory decree 
was proper, largely in part due to the statistical evidence provided by the 
committee detailing production costs and competition considerations of the 
industry. 136 It noted that: 
During the year 1952, the four enterprises under study had revenues of 
$17,055,577, the total sum of sales being $11,311,962. The gross benefit 
was $5,743,615. Of such gross benefit, there was a deduction of general 
costs of sale and administration that totaled $3,052,522, leaving a re-
mainder benefit for operations of $2,691,093. This benefit of operation 
equaled 15.8 per cent of the sales and 37.8 per cent over capital and ac-
cumulated remainder . . . . 
After summarizing the extensive statistical study in its Determination of 
Facts, the Board concluded that, “Due to the previous considerations we 
believe that the economic situation of the beer industry in Puerto Rico 
contains a wide enough margin to increase the salaries that it pays to its 
employees.” 
. . . . 
. . . [T]he Board in every moment considered and had in mind the four 
companies that produced alcoholic beer and non-alcoholic beer, general-
ly considered as malt. Such four enterprises constituted the beer industry 
in Puerto Rico. The conclusions of fact reached by the Board, acting on 
its powers, are conclusive in absence of fraud.137
The Court was deferential to Board and the numbers its minimum 
wage committees produced. 
134.  Id.
 135.  Id. § 29(b). 
 136.  83 P.R. 267, 271 (1961). 
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C. Social Norms 
U.S.-based unions, threatening to throw a wrench into Puerto Rico’s 
wage moderation policy, reignited the Board and its mandatory decrees. 
They revived labor as an autonomous actor in Puerto Rico, at least in the 
garment sector. They also revived the Board’s tripartite structure, which 
had been quashed by Munoz Marín’s incorporation of labor leaders into the 
PDP government and the state machinery. As they revived the Board, they 
also created conditions to organize workers in Puerto Rico and to bargain 
collectively with employers. How? Miles Galvin showed that, having set 
wages with employers at the Board, U.S. unions negotiated nominal wage 
gains above the stated minimum levels and fringe benefits through collec-
tive bargaining.138 Here, preexisting, amicable relationships between U.S. 
employers and U.S. unions became fundamental. Binding law—and politi-
cal power—was therefore not the end of the story. Unions’ relationships 
with employers also helped. Having resolved most important economic 
matters, wages, at the Board and having been bargaining parties for dec-
ades prior to entering Puerto Rico, U.S.-based employers did not oppose 
the union’s organizing efforts. Some, if not most of them, seem to have 
granted the ILGWU neutrality and card check recognition when the union 
asked for it. 
We can see how the ILGWU received a neutrality and card check 
recognition in the fact statement of a 1960s NLRB case where local (Puerto 
Rican) union leaders accused the ILGWU of being a “company union.”139
In that case, testimony showed the close proximity between the ILGWU 
and U.S.-based garment shops. One U.S. garment shop manager told his 
workers the following when the ILGWU was organizing the shop: 
I think you and me, the workers in Coamo, and the Company have gotten 
along well for many years. There is mutual respect and friendship. . . . 
[O]ver a year ago, we merged with a public corporation, Bobbie Brooks, 
the best and largest company in the apparel field. . . . 
There are a number of benefits to use from the merger—steadier em-
ployment and greater availability of capital for new equipment. There are 
also certain obligations. One of these is the requirement that we sign a 
contract with the International Ladies’ Garment Workers’ Union if you 
want the union. Our parent company, Bobbie Brooks, has had contractu-
 138.  GALVIN, supra note 20, at 151. For example, in a union drive, the ILGWU promised workers 
the union would seek from management concessions for: “an additional holiday, additional vacation 
benefits, and a better welfare program. He further declared that the ILGWU would not sign a contract in 
Puerto Rico unless it provided for a wage increase of at least 5 cents per hour.” Coamo Knitting Mills, 
Inc. and Federación Puertorriqueña de Sindicatos Democráticos, 150 N.L.R.B. 579, 586 (1964). 
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al dealings with this union for twenty-three years. . . . Seriously, the 
ILGWU has shown itself to be a responsible and intelligent Union, and 
we anticipate no problems if we deal with them. 
During the next few days, representatives of Union will be in Coamo to 
solicit your membership. Although you are under no compulsion, we 
urge you to join. The Company will negotiate a contract with the union, 
which we believe will be mutually beneficial.140
Accustomed as we are to the anti-union stance of most employers 
since at least the 1980s, the employer’s speech here presents a stark con-
trast.141 The reason appears to lie, at least in important part, on the union’s 
preexisting relationships with those managers. 
Evidence that these pre-existing relationships mattered can be found in 
certain unfair labor practice cases filed by Puerto Rican unions against the 
ILGWU and the American garment shops. For example, in the case already 
cited, Coamo Kniting Mills, the pro-union attitude of garment employers 
appeared to be reserved for the ILGWU. As the case above attests, the em-
ployer favored the ILGWU, so much that a local Puerto Rican union called 
the Federación Puertorriqueña de Sindicatos Democráticos (“Federación”) 
claimed that the ILGWU was a company union, in violation of Section 
8(a)(2) of the NLRA.142 According to the Federación, it was organizing 
employees at Coamo Knitttin Mills, a 170-employee plant in the south of 
Puerto Rico owned by an Ohio corporation by the name of Colebrook 
Mills, itself a subsidiary of Bobbie Brooks.143 As it was doing so, the head 
of the ILGWU in Puerto Rico, Jerry Schoen, arrived at the plant to give the 
aforementioned speech to the workers and collect union cards.144 That open 
method of organizing, with employer neutrality and card check recognition, 
contrasted with the almost clandestine method of the Puerto Rican union, 
evidencing a lack of a collaborative relationship between the Puerto Rican 
union and the American employer, and the opposite for the ILGWU. Sec-
 140.  Id. at 596. 
 141.  See Weiler, supra note 35, at 1776–78 (arguing that employer opposition and weak penalties 
against them contributed to U.S. union decline). Even European companies that typically abide with 
international labor standards regarding freedom of association typically oppose unionization campaigns, 
adopting the American way. See Lance Compa & Fred Feinstein, Enforcing European Corporate 
Commitments to Freedom of Association by Legal and Industrial Action in the United States: Enforce-
ment by Industrial Action, 33 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 635, 644 (2013) (detailing captive audience 
speeches, denial of access to union organizers, and coalescing with Chamber of Commerce employers 
against employee attempts to unionize). 
 142.  Coamo Knitting Mills, 150 N.L.R.B. at 583. 
 143.  Id. at 584. 
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ondary literature has detailed the collaborative relationships between the 
ILGWU and employers in Puerto Rico.145
Evidence of what the ILGWU bargained for and what was contained 
in the collective bargaining agreements further shows why U.S. garment 
shops favored the ILGWU and not other unions. The ILGWU would, in 
essence, request that the employer make concessions on just a few items, 
such as marginal wage increases (slightly above those set by the Board, 
sometimes five cents), holiday pay, vacation benefits, and a welfare pro-
gram.146 The rest of the contract incorporated the terms of the Bobbie 
Brooks contracts that the union had already bargained for in the continental 
United States; the unions and the employers in essence extended the non-
economic terms of their U.S. master contracts to Puerto Rico.147 These 
extensions of master agreements were even sometimes done in haste to 
preempt union elections called by non-ILGWU unions.148 As the evidence 
in the Coamo Knitting Mills case recounted: 
On the next day, July 18, two representatives of the Federación appeared 
outside the Company’s plant, addressed the employees through a loud-
speaker, and distributed literature on behalf of the Federación. Wolf [the 
company manager] obtained one of these leaflets. He then telephoned 
Schoen [the ILGWU Regional Director], told him what had happened, 
and read the leaflet’s contents to him. In the same telephone conversa-
tion, Wolf and Schoen arranged to meet in San Juan the following day. 
Accordingly, on July 19 and again on July 20 Wolf and Schoen, accom-
panied by Sanchez [the Puerto Rican union officer of the ILGWU], met 
and negotiated the terms of a collective-bargaining contract. On the latter 
date the understanding was reduced to writing and signed. It provides, 
inter alia, for recognition of the ILGWU as the exclusive bargaining 
agent of all the Company’s employees, with exclusions not here materi-
al; “a Union shop and the monthly checkoff of Union dues in accord 
with articles II and III of the Puerto Rican ILGWU Standard Independent 
Agreement”; five paid holidays; certain “vacation pay”; a wage increase 
of 5 cents per hour for all workers “without prejudicing the Union’s po-
 145.  See GERVASIO GARCÍA & ANGEL QUINTERO RIVERA, DESAFÍO Y SOLIDARIDAD: BREVE
HISTORIA DEL MOVIMIENTO OBRERO PUERTORRIQUEÑO 137 (1986). Left-wing union activists in the 
United States had already been denouncing the ILGWU as a union that negotiated sweetheart deals with 
employers. See Michael Myerson, The ILGWU: A Union that Fights for Lower Wages 51 (1968), 
https://www.marxists.org/subject/jewish/myerson-ilgwu.pdf [https://perma.cc/BZV7-YJWZ] (arguing 
that the policy of the ILGWU had been, for decades, to demand meager wage increases to protect jobs). 
 146.  Coamo Knitting Mills, 150 N.L.R.B. at 586. 
 147.  For example, in Coamo Knitting Mills, the evidence showed that since 1959 Bobbie Brooks 
and the ILGWU had “a single overall agreement to cover all Bobbie Brooks plants in the United States 
whether owned by Bobbie Brooks or any of its subsidiaries or affiliates.” Id. at 591. However, the 
parties had an oral agreement that the economic terms of the master contracts would not apply immedi-
ately to any particular plant acquired by Bobbie Brooks, requiring specific contracts for such economic 
terms for each new plant. Id. at 592. 
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sition that additional increases are called for”; it lists certain “unre-
solved” questions; states that certain other specified matters were not 
discussed “because presumably covered by the Bobbie Brooks agree-
ment”; and provides that it shall be effective from July 15, 1963, to De-
cember 31, 1964. Upon the execution of the agreement, Wolf notified 
Galinanez [the plant’s manager] to raise the wages of all employees 5 
cents per hour, retroactive to July 15. Galinanez accordingly raised hour-
ly rates 5 cents and refigured piece rates so as to provide an equivalent 
increase. The new piece rates were posted on the plant bulletin board the 
following Monday, July 22. The notices included the fact that the new 
rates had been made effective as of July 15 (internal citations omit-
ted).149
Hence, the ILGWU brought with it its existing relationships, including 
master contracts, that built employers’ trust in that union specifically, and 
likely not others, which facilitated union organizing in the end. Likely aid-
ed by the Board, where most of the wage issues were resolved, the ILGWU 
could thus blend sectoral and plant-level strategies to organize the garment 
sector. 
U.S. union strategies worked. As we can learn from the Coamo Kit-
ting Mills case, Puerto Rican unions had to organize clandestinely and in 
sharp opposition to management. Moreover, other Puerto Rican organizers 
had just about given up on the sector. Prior to the ILGWU’s entry, a Puerto 
Rican union organizer funded by U.S. unions complained that “family tra-
ditions, Latin temperaments, moral standards, and interference with the 
freedom that a woman organizer must have in her private life” made it 
impossible for him to organize the sector.150 In other words, the organizer 
blamed machismo for his incapacity to organize garment workers, most of 
whom were female. And yet, the ILGWU, a “gringa” union from New 
York, was successful in breaking through the alleged cultural and gender 
barriers when it decided to organize the sector directly. By the end of 1959, 
four years after the ILGWU decided to directly organize workers in Puerto 
Rico, the ILGWU was able to organize more than 7,000 workers, or about 
22% of the 20,000 garment workers on the island at the time.151 By 1973, 
the number of workers who had joined the ILGWU surpassed the 13,000 
mark, or 39% of all garment workers in Puerto Rico.152 These were tre-
mendous successes in light of the prevailing view in the early 1950s that 
the sector could not be organized. 
 149.  Id. at 587. 
 150.  Rosado Marzán, supra note 28, at 61 (citing Letter from Miguel Garriga, Regional Director, 
Federación del Trabajo de Puerto Rico to David Dubinsky, President, ILGWU (Feb. 9, 1954) (on file 
with Kheel Center Archives Box 258)). 
 151.  Id. at 62. 
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IV. ANALYSIS
We can generate some hypotheses to help explain why U.S. unions 
were able to significantly organize the garment sector in Puerto Rico 
through sectoral bargaining, while the Fight for $15 and Fast Food Justice 
still face challenges doing something similar in the New York fast food 
sector today. First, U.S. unions in Puerto Rico leveraged significant power 
against the government of Puerto Rico. They posed a significant threat to 
the island’s low wage policy and federal exemption of the FLSA. While 
unions have significant influence in New York, they do not appear to wield 
the type of potentially disruptive power that the U.S. unions had over the 
poverty struck territory of Puerto Rico in the 1950s. Political power mat-
ters. 
Second, U.S. unions in Puerto Rico used their power to wield repre-
sentation rights under the law and co-set legally binding wages in the gar-
ment industry. In New York, unions provide mere opinions to the tripartite 
committees, which in turn only recommend wages to the Commissioner. 
The Puerto Rican model, where the Board set the wages, seems to have 
helped unions organize at the shop level, as it resolved most economic, 
shop-level disputes sectorally, diminishing employer opposition to union 
presence in the shop floor. 
New York does not have a similar board. True, in New York State the 
Commissioner seeks advice from a tripartite board before ordering mini-
mum wages adequate to sustain the “life and health” of workers, which is 
more than what happens in today’s purely parliamentary minimum wage 
systems in most of the United States. However, a system in which wage 
boards give advice is leagues away from one where the unions, employers, 
and government leaders actually agree on wages. In the New York model, 
parties might still be dissatisfied with the level of minimum wages set by 
the Commissioner. Employers may not trust that unions will cease making 
demands on employers at the plant level even after the Commissioner has 
raised wages. In the end, adversarial relationships likely remain after the 
Commissioner’s actions, doing little to set the stage for collective bargain-
ing. 
Puerto Rico offers a different story: Once wages were set by the par-
ties through the wage committees and the Board’s mandatory decrees, em-
ployers appeared willing to tolerate unions, or at least the ILGWU. 
Preexisting relationships with employers also seem to have helped neutral-
ize employer opposition at the plant level. Employers knew what non-
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other contracts between the ILGWU and the garment shops in the United 
States—and that the union would very likely not press them more on wag-
es, at least not significantly. The dual combination of wage board negotia-
tions and preexisting collective bargaining relationships thus opened the 
way for neutrality and card check recognition for the ILGWU, which then 
spurred unionization. 
The evidence also shows that employers did not welcome Puerto Ri-
can local unions while they welcomed the ILGWU. But would employers 
have given neutrality and card check recognition to the ILGWU without its 
having dealt previously with wages at the Board? While it is impossible to 
answer that question given that we do not have an alternative universe to 
investigate, it is hard to envision the ILGWU being welcomed by U.S.-
based employers without its first not having resolved the contentious wage 
issues at the Board. After all, the ILGWU was on the record as wanting to 
extend the FLSA to the island and curb “runaway industry,” a position that 
U.S. employers would have obviously resisted. On the other hand, what if 
the ILGWU never went on the record opposing runaway industry? Could it 
have agreed with employers on wages outside the structure of the Board? 
Perhaps, but doing so would have undermined its contracts in the United 
States. Mainland union members would have been displeased with their 
union if it was bargaining for lower wages in Puerto Rico, to their detri-
ment. The Board gave an “out” to the ILGWU, since it could deflect some 
blame to the government of Puerto Rico for not agreeing on higher wages 
(as the union many times complained about). This is all to say that the evi-
dence points to relevant effects of the Board on union organization in Puer-
to Rico’s garment industry, but it was certainly not the only important 
reason. Hence, while the evidence presented here makes it difficult to esti-
mate with precision the independent effects of sectoral bargaining and the 
pre-existing relationships on overall unionization of the garment factories, 
the evidence strongly suggests that both conditions, sectoral bargaining and 
preexisting relationships, provided for union organizing in Puerto Rico’s 
garment shops. 
Persistent employer opposition has proven to be a real obstacle in New 
York and elsewhere in the United States. “It takes two to tango,” as the 
saying goes, and U.S. employers don’t really want to dance.153 Hence, New 
York sectoral bargaining is embryonic—if even that. It is impossible to 
 153.  The case of Puerto does not help us to definitely discern if those pre-existing relationships 
were essential. It could have been the case that the relationships and trust built merely through the 
Board could have been enough for unions to organize the sector. Other case studies could help us 
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determine if it will develop into something where unions, as collective 
bargaining agents, will grow. Union insistence on using the present system 
to set minimum wages might just preserve the status quo, where no collec-
tive agents are enfranchised to formally bargain and set wages and, through 
the process, resolve important disputes that engender employer opposition 
to unions. In the extremely unlikely event that New York enfranchises col-
lective bargaining agents to set wages, will employers want to willingly 
participate in that system? It is certainly not obvious that they will. In all, 
it’s hard to say if the “new labor law” will take any particular shape in the 
United States. To the extent Puerto Rico charts any path towards union 
renewal through a wage board, it appears that positive outcomes, negative 
ones, or nothing at all, at least in terms of union membership, might ulti-
mately prevail in the United States given the lack of union political lever-
age over the government, a binding system of tripartite wage-setting, and 
collaborative relationships between unions and employers. 
V. CONCLUSION: SUCCESS IN PUERTO RICO, BUT NOT NECESSARILY
ELSEWHERE
This article has compared New York’s minimum wage law with Puer-
to Rico’s 1950s experience. It has shown that, while both laws provide for 
labor, management, and government input to set wages, Puerto Rico’s was 
much more traditionally tripartite; the three parties had to negotiate to set 
binding mandatory decrees, while in New York ultimate authority still lies 
with the state executive. Moreover, in New York, management need not 
participate in the wage boards and, in fact, in the latest campaign with fast 
food, the major companies did not co-set the wages. The Puerto Rico case 
thus shows the importance of a law that enfranchises the parties to bargain 
at a sectoral level.154 It also shows the importance of union political power: 
 154.  Professor Kate Andrias has suggested, however, that some employer lobbies and conserva-
tives might argue that a true system of sectoral bargaining might face preemption challenges under the 
NLRA, since only NLRA-sanctioned processes legitimize bargaining on behalf of employees and 
employers in the United States. Andrias, supra note 4, at 91. Rules that alter the NLRA-sanctioned 
process, including any rules that alter the role that the NLRA lets the market play to structure collective 
bargaining has been said to be preempted by the NLRA. Id. While preemption analysis is beyond the 
limits of this paper, it appears that the challenge would be ultimately unsuccessful since wage boards 
are tripartite; they include the state as a necessary party that then extends the tripartite agreement to the 
rest of the sector. Sectoral bargaining through wage boards are not private agreements between a labor 
and management, which then get imposed by the state. Wages are co-negotiated with the state, which 
has authority to regulate minimum wages. In this sense, it is not the type of collective bargaining that 
the NLRA is concerned about regulating. 
We should add that to the knowledge of this author, the Puerto Rican system was never successfully 
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the AFL-CIO and the ILGWU could throw a wrench into Puerto Rico’s 
low-wage policy justifying federal exemption from the FLSA, compelling 
the government of Puerto Rico to give a space for the ILGWU to partici-
pate in the island’s wage committees. And, finally, social relationships and 
norms established after many years with U.S. employers also enabled the 
union to obtain neutrality and card check recognition. All of these elements 
seem to lack in the New York and the U.S. case. It is difficult to ascertain if 
wage boards can truly invigorate U.S. labor, or at least its union member-
ship numbers. 
So, under what conditions can wage boards help revitalize unions in 
the United States? To the extent the Puerto Rican case charts a path, it sug-
gests that political power, binding law, and social norms matter. And if we 
were to follow the Puerto Rican path, New York (and the U.S.) have a very 
uphill path to trek. How to build political power, reform the law, and build 
collaborative relationships between unions and management is beyond the 
limits of this article, but these are the hard issues that U.S. legal reformers 
and activists will likely need to confront. 
board system might also face delegation challenges, but these challenges seem also hard to prevail. Id.
As professor Andrias states, “the statutes set forth a clear legislative policy position and then vest more 
specific decision-making authority in an expert body, without excessively delegating to private parties.” 
Andrias, supra note 4, at 89.  
